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K. M. Newton, Modernizing George Eliot: The miter as Artist, Intellectual, 
Proto-Modernist, Cultural Critic (Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), pp 230. ISBN 
978 1 84966 3. 
This distinguished work by a major Eliot scholar is the product of decades of reading, writing 
and reflection on her fiction and thought. It brings together in revised, homogenized form a 
series of essays from 1972 to the present day, including new material; and further, it engages 
with and amplifies two of Newton's earlier monographs on Eliot, as well as his collection of 
essays by other critics on Eliot utilizing modem literary theory. Despite dealing with complex 
philosophical ideas, Newton's writing is clear and lucid throughout, bringing to light new 
insights without the unnecessary jargon that occasionally taints modem criticism. Newton also 
considers nineteenth-century criticism, most usefully that of Lewes, making connections also 
with Austen and Scott and drawing fascinating parallels between the plots of Little Dorrit and 
Daniel Deronda: he places Eliot above these three writers as an artist, however. Despite some 
blemishes this comprehensive monograph demonstrates the radical nature of Eliot's 
intelligence, her innovative experiments with literary form and her status as 'both artist and ... 
intellectual. [T]he two are not separable' (69; emphasis added). Newton firmly establishes 
Eliot's relevance for the twenty-first century - her affinities with writers from Yeats and Joyce 
to Derrida and Levinas, and with modernist and post-modernist ideas. Use of post-structuralist 
criticism helps tease out subversive sub-texts, highlighting Eliot's intense scepticism and the 
range of her thinking in ethics, politics and philosophy. Newton places Eliot in the literary 
canon alongside Dante, Milton and Goethe, high - and probably merited - praise indeed. This 
work can come across as a sustained defence of Eliot against her detractors, but it offers 
considerably more than this. 
Placing Eliot so high on her pedestal - an action to which the present writer must also 
plead guilty - may invite a repetition of early-twentieth-century attempts by envious writers to 
push her off that lofty perch: the 'half malicious' critics after her death, like George Meredith, 
referred to by Virginia Woolf in her centenary article, who 'gave point and poison to the arrows 
of thousands incapable of aiming them so accurately, but delighted to let fly'. There has also 
been much disparagement of Eliot's work on ideological grounds, of course. Raising an artist 
so high also creates a tendency to dwarf her peers. Newton thus, in reaction to assertions that 
Eliot is less 'feminist' than a writer like Charlotte Bronte, cites Pauline Nestor's assessment of 
Jane Eyre as simply a 'heroine of fulfilment' - 'a psychological fantasy of the extraordinary ... 
assurance of Jane's ego, '" markedly at odds with the childhood circumstances that produced 
it. Such a fantasy is diametrically opposed to Eliot's commitment to psychological veracity' 
(n. 14, 197). Yet Bronte's novels can also be seen as life 'experiments'. Thus Lucy Snowe in 
Villette, subject to early trauma, is alienated, neurotic and prone to breakdowns. 
Hopefully Newton's cogently argued book (one of a cluster of accomplished works 
currently appearing) will counter iconoclastic tendencies. He undermines previous emphases 
on Eliot's 'earnestness'. She is, as he maintains, a great teacher of ethics, a moral philosopher 
with affinities with Kant - but tough-minded, avoiding sentimental concessions to preaching 
or gratuitous earnestness, and only too aware of the irresolvable difficulties most of us face. 
She dislikes either/or binaries and conceptual oppositions, and describes Kant as mistaken in 
regarding 'synthetical and analytic judgements as two classes' (50). In 'More leaves from a 
Notebook' (ed. Pinney) Eliot states paradoxically: 'It is rational to accept two irreconcilables 
... '. With sophistication, Newton argues that her fiction 'shows that moral choice cannot be 
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totally secure and thus free of anxiety since future events may reveal that a different choice 
should or could have been made' - witness Maggie in The Mill, whose ultimate decision 
regarding Stephen cannot immediately be ratified as correct, because Maggie can have no 
knowledge of the future outcome of that decision. Newton comments pertinently: 'Moral 
choice cannot be totally secure and thus free of anxiety since future events may reveal that a 
different choice could or should have been made .... [T]ime is not relevant for Kant [but] for 
Eliot the ethical cannot completely exclude the temporal' (50). These poignant comments are 
especially applicable to Mordecai's (and Eliot's) pre-Zionism, which - an added complication 
- has created both winners (the Jews) and losers (the Palestinians), not unexpected 
preoccupations in a novel dominated by tropes of gambling and, Newton demonstrates, 
concepts like 'moral luck'. Similarly to Derrida, says Newton, for Eliot, 'to be human is 
continually to be confronted by undecidability and the need to decide' (164). He also, in a 
subtle reading of that text which is crucial to us now, 'The Modem Hep! Hep! Hep!', points to 
the difficult double bind of colonialism: the original Celtic inhabitants of Britain were largely 
exterminated by Saxon invaders, and the English are now a miscellaneous people who have 
been composed of a mixture of Romans, Vikings and Normans. The Americans too are a mixed 
people. Yet both countries have become 'great' nations. Should we say with hindsight that the 
original colonization of these countries, which involved extermination, was misguided? And 
how will posterity judge Israel's establishment? 
Eliot, in response to her depiction of moral dilemmas, has been disparaged as 
'confused'. Rather, she is complex and divided, aware of the limitations of seeing things from 
a single point of view. In my opinion it is virtually impossible for a great thinker to maintain 
an entirely consistent and coherent position. (Newton would see her as more in control of 
complicating contradictions). 
In consequence of Barthes's critique of realism, Middlemarch has been labelled 'a 
classic realist text', a grand narrative with an all-knowing teller who presents a consistent 
world view, part of a quasi-metaphysical perspective controlled by Nemesis (or the Deity), 
punishing misdemeanours without ironic deconstruction. Newton points out that a distinction 
needs to be made between the narrator, a construct, and the real author. The narrator is part of 
the novel's world, at one remove from the actual writer, and is an interpreter who should be 
identified with 'reality' or 'truth' (62). '[TJhe narrator is a persona who is integrated into the 
fiction with a tone of voice separate from the author' (68). The content of Middlemarch, as 
well as its form, and the narrator, are sometimes at odds in Eliot's work - deliberately so. Yet 
her modernist successors have largely assumed that her narrator, complicit in maintaining 
bourgeois or other ideologies, sustains the status quo without question. Others, fettering Eliot 
to Jamesian prescriptions for the 'great realist novel', have critiqued her deviation from these 
prescriptions. 
In her approach to modernist and even post-modernist representations, some critics 
have suggested, alternatively, a preference on Eliot's part for the fragmentary over monism. 
She is difficult to pin down. A post-modernist might regard Henry James's comment that 
Middlemarch is 'a treasure-house of detail' but 'an indifferent whole' (1) as a compliment, 
which, together with Eliot's 'Finale' to a novel that refuses complete finality, is in line with 
modem suspicions of absolute 'truth'. The metaphor of the web, creating interdependence that 
binds together all social life and historic connections in Middlemarch, could be deconstructed: 
the strands of the web might be warring signifiers. Of course, Eliot's novel that comes nearest 
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to a proto-post modernist text is Daniel Deronda. The daring marriage of a realist form with 
mythopoetic prose that has affinities with romance creates a feeling of fragmentation in some 
readers, although Newton contends that the two plots are connected by thematic similarities, 
the use of coincidence, and the spillage of one form into the other, not least in the use of 
coincidence. Much ink has been spilt, of course, over whether this new experimental form 
works. Newton rightly devotes a large portion of the monograph to this most modem and 
challenging of George Eliot's novels. 
In my view Newton's initial discussions of Eliot's attitudes to race are the weakest 
portion of the book: the lumping together of Robert Knox and James Hunt, 'the notorious 
racists' (149), and the simple binary which sees polygenists as vulgar essentialists but 
monogenists (amongst whom Newton correctly includes Darwin and Eliot herself) as anti-
racist. The matter is more complicated and nuanced. Newton cites Darwin's reference to 
'Bushmen' as 'the lowest existing savages' (ibid), although conversely he disliked slavery. In 
fact classic monogenism ('ethnology') had had its day by the time The Origin of Species 
appeared (1859), and at this period Eliot was forty and had looked at the many anthropological 
works that preceded Darwin. Primarily benign in intent (with lapses into hostility), the 
monogenist view of the early century was that, as all peoples share the same lineage, Britain 
had a 'mission' to carry 'Christian civilisation' across the globe so that the 'families of 
mankind' could be brought to the same level as Europeans. But peoples outside the select orbit 
gradually were viewed with hostility once they became intransigent, leading to James Hunt's 
crude and vulgar, polygenist 'negrophobia', his endorsement of slavery and general distaste for 
'non-Europeans'. Before Darwin's appearance on the horizon, Eliot had considered (and 
ultimately rejected) the essentialist ideas of Cuvier and the more complex theories of Lamarck, 
Spencer and Wallace. Unlike Hunt, Knox (though polygenist and anxious about 
'miscegenation') was fundamentally benign. He wanted 'others' left alone - a different form 
of racism - and was strongly opposed to colonialism and slavery. Eliot had some sympathy 
with Knox and his ideas, alluding to him several times in Middlemarch. Knox compromised 
his brilliant career as a comparative anatomist by an unwise marriage and an unwitting 
involvement in scandal and murder connected with his professional work. Clearly, Lydgate 
was, in part, modelled on Knox. Defensive of Eliot, Newton sees 'no simple and 
straightforward access to Eliot's views on race' (because of mediation through the narrator -
150). There are, though, her letters and private essays. Later, Darwinian monogenism was a 
compromise position between polygenism and monogenism, and ultimately Eliot subscribed to 
the view she shared with Darwin: the 'affinities and repulsions' model. This regarded mixtures 
between peoples at a similar level of cultural development, like Europeans (and Jews), as 
strengthening humanity (eg. Klesmer), but crossings of 'disparate' races, or between 'close' 
families, could be disastrous (see Letters, I, 246). These anxieties are played out in Felix Halt, 
in the characters of old Mr Transome and young Harry, both of whom share a similar 
'backwardness' based on these 'pathologies', and romp together around the home as if soul 
mates. In 'Notes on the Spanish Gypsy and Tragedy' (in Cross's Life) Eliot remarks that she 
required the 'opposition of race to give the need for renouncing ... marriage' between Silva and 
the Gypsy, Fedalma, an 'incongrous' mixture. However, as Newton points out, Eliot also had 
in mind an idealist construct of afuture 'fusion of races' (172). While this is incredibly forward 
looking, one still hesitates to apply to Eliot the hackneyed phrase, 'ahead of her time'. She was 
also very much of her time, as her interest in discourses like eugenics (obviously distasteful to 
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modem readers, but no fault of Eliot's) demonstrates. Newton valuably trounces one-sided 
critics who simply see Eliot as racist and complicit with colonialism. She is neither, in 
nineteenth-century terms. Placed besides Dickens, Thackeray, Kingsley et ai, her liberalism is 
remarkable for her time. She was primarily a cultural / racial relativist with a distaste for 
slavery and sympathy for displaced, 'punished' peoples. 
Newton is at his most powerful, unravelling the interplay between psychological states 
and the (predominantly Darwinian) absence of any outward morality - an excellent riposte to 
critics who censure Eliot's alleged use of Christian morality despite her agnosticism. Few 
readers of George Eliot: Romantic Humanist (1981) will forget Newton's splendid analysis of 
Tito Melema's subsidence into a terrible state of fear and consequent shock because of his 
rationalist belief that there is no moral order and he can therefore devote himself to self-
interest. There are also powerful explications of a similar pathology in Godfrey Cass, Duke 
Silva and Silas Mamer in the present work. There is, too, convincing explanation of the painful 
experiences and dilemmas of Deronda, to demonstrate that he is a flesh-and-blood character 
(though one would have preferred to feel these in the novel in the latter case, rather than have 
them explained). Since human beings are social animals, 'Morality and justice are shown not 
to be immanent in the world ... but as ... purely human constructions, though not the less valid 
for that' (133). '[Flor Eliot human identity is social in a constitutive sense and those of her 
characters, such as ... Christian in Felix Holt, who attempt to live purely individualistic lives, 
virtually cease to have human identities' (ibid). If God does not exist, goodness based on 
human feeling is crucial for individual survival since 'the ego itself is in a large degree a 
cultural product' (33). No one is self-sufficient. On this basis Silva's apostasy and rebellion 
against Spanish life in favour of Gypsy rebellion is scrutinized with clear-eyed sympathy as the 
cause of his breakdown and murder of Zarca. Furthermore, self dividedness and conflicting 
values like Silva's cause immense suffering, being symptomatic of the complications of 
modem consciousness and the clashing of ethnic values as the world shrinks. 
To sum up, despite certain criticisms expressed above, Newton's new monograph as a 
whole is a remarkable work that reveals comprehensively Eliot's engagement with ideas still 
relevant to the twenty-first century (many of which, like the modem and experimental nature 
of Silas Mamer, or the disquisition on colonialism, could not be included here). It is an 
illuminating contribution to knowledge. 
Brenda McKay 
Birkbeck College and Hertfordshire University 
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